Abstract. Key-Alternating Feistel (KAF) ciphers, a.k.a. Feistel-2 models, refer to Feistel networks with round functions of the form Fi(ki⊕xi), where ki is the (secret) round-key and Fi is a public random function. This model roughly captures the structures of many famous Feistel ciphers, and the most prominent instance is DES. Existing provable security results on KAF assumed independent round-keys and round functions (ASI-ACRYPT 2004 & FSE 2014. In this paper, we investigate how to achieve security under simpler and more realistic assumptions: with round-keys derived from a short main-key, and hopefully with identical round functions. For birthday-type security, we consider 4-round KAF, investigate the minimal conditions on the way to derive the four round-keys, and prove that when such adequately derived keys and the same round function are used, the 4-round KAF is secure up to 2 n/2 queries. For beyond-birthday security, we focus on 6-round KAF. We prove that when the adjacent round-keys are independent, and independent round-functions are used, the 6 round KAF is secure up to 2 2n/3 queries. To our knowledge, this is the first beyond-birthday security result for KAF without assuming completely independent round-keys. Our results hold in the multi-user setting as well, constituting the first non-trivial multi-user provable security results on Feistel ciphers. We finally demonstrate applications of our results on designing keyschedules and instantiating keyed sponge constructions.
Introduction
Overview. We extend provable security of models of practical Feistel ciphers along multi-axes. First, we (significantly) reduce the key-sizes needed for super pseudorandom security. Second, we provide the first non-trivial multi-user provable results. We also exhibit applications of our results: on designing key-schedules for practical Feistel ciphers, and on instantiating keyed sponges. Background. Practical iterative blockcipher (BC) designs roughly fall into two classes (with some rare exceptions such as IDEA), namely Feistel ciphers and their generalizations, and substitution-permutation networks (SPNs). In a Feistel cipher, in the i-th round, the intermediate state
, where G i is called the i-th round function. On the other hand, their counterpart SPNs could be further abstracted as the iterated Even-Mansour (IEM) ciphers, or keyalternating ciphers, which consist of alternatively applying round-key additions and keyless round permutations, i.e. IEM P1,...,Pt k0,k1,...,kt (M ) = k t ⊕ P t (. . . (k 1 ⊕ P 1 (k 0 ⊕ M ))). The traditional security notion for BCs is pseudorandomness: for any adversary with reasonable resources (e.g. polynomial complexity), the BC with a random and secret key should be indistinguishable from a truly random permutation. Proving such security for concrete BCs such as AES seems out of the reach of current techniques. Yet, by idealizing the underlying round functions, security could be proved. Following this line, both idealized Feistel [37, 35] and IEM [22, 11] have been proposed and analyzed.
Our Problem. The secret-key analyzes of KAF of GR [24] and LS [35] mentioned before leave two remarkable gaps. The first gap lies between the models and ciphers in practice. In detail, both LS and GR assumed completely Independent Round-Keys (INDRK). In contrast, BCs in practice utilize identical round functions as well as round-keys derived from a short main-key (thus highly correlated rather than completely independent). Security arguments with correlated round-keys are desired to bridge this gap.
On the theoretical side, arguments with correlated round-keys reduce the amount of key required by secure cryptosystems, and sometimes lead to minimal designs [21, 14] . Therefore, such arguments are of great importance from both practical and theoretical points of view, and while the INDRK assumption is common in seminal theoretical results, e.g. LR [37], IEM [11] , and models for SPNs [40] , subsequent works usually tried to remove it. For example, Patarin et al. analyzed the possibility of designing secure LR variants using a single random function (which is equivalent to pseudorandom function with a single round-key) [46, 51, 47, 44 ,45]; Chen et al. analyzed 2-round IEM with correlated round-keys and even identical permutations [14] ; and Dodis et al. proved results for SPN models with correlated round-keys [20] .
Regarding the round complexity for beyond-birthday security, there is one more gap. While optimal security up to 2 n queries cannot be achieved by a small constant number of rounds of KAF (as discussed before), the optimal security of 6-round LR motivates ones to expect that the 6-round KAF is at least beyond-birthday secure. However, LS only proved (beyond-birthday) security against 2n/3 queries for 12-round KAF, which is twice as the expected rounds. Contribution I: Security with Correlated Round-Keys. We narrow the above gaps, and make the first step towards minimizing sufficient conditions for the provable security of KAF models. The results consist of two parts depending on the security goal. Birthday-Type Security: Minimal Solution with 4 Rounds. In this regime, we consider the KAF ciphers with all the round functions identical, as depicted in Fig. 1 (left) , and denote it KAFSF to make a clear distinction. For such variants, if the round-keys are also identical, then for S T = KAFSF(L R) it always holds KAFSF −1 (T S) = R L, which means it can be distinguished by 2 queries (more severely, this allows ruining the secrecy of the plaintext in the CPA setting). Consequently, there have to be some non-trivial correlations between the round-keys. To unveil this, we investigate the minimal conditions on the round-keys that suffice for security. We prove that for the four n-bit round keys (k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , k 4 ), as long as k 1 , k 4 , and k 1 ⊕ k 4 are all uniform (a quite mild requirement), the 4-round KAFSF is secure up to 2 n/2 queries. The bound is tight, since any 4-round Feistel can be distinguished by 2 n/2 queries [44]. This general result on the round-keys allows us to derive them from a short main-key in various ways. For the best efficiency, one could drop k 2 and k 3 , and set k 1 ← K and k 4 ← ϕ(K), where ϕ is an orthomorphism of F n 2 , cf. Fig. 1 (right) . 5 This yields a super pseudorandom KAF cipher from a single random function and an n-bit main-key. This construction is theoretically "minimal" in the sense that removing any of the components ruins security: removing ϕ brings the severe weakness KAFSF(L R) = S T ⇔ KAFSF −1 (T S) = R L back, while 5 A permutation ϕ of F n 2 is an orthomorphism if K → K ⊕ ϕ(K) is also a permutation. The Feistel-like linear transformation ϕ(KL KR) = KL ⊕ KR KL is a very efficient instance. Orthomorphisms have found many cryptographic applications, particularly in minimizing LR [51] and IEM models [14] .
removing any call to F brings us back to a 3-round Feistel network, which is not super pseudorandom. While it appears crazy to completely drop k 2 and k 3 , this actually matches an early theoretical result of Ramzan and Reyzin [49] , which will be discussed later. However, we stress our "minimal" scheme is of mainly theoretical interest. Most importantly, we are not advocating following it to design general purpose Feistel ciphers.
Birthday-type security is now usually deemed as quite weak. For example, general purpose Feistel BCs usually take 2n = 128, for which a birthday-bound merely ensures 32-bit security. Though, we believe it's of significance to deepen the understanding of birthday-type security, shape existing results, and derive theoretically minimal constructions.
Beyond-Birthday Security: Improved Results with 6 Rounds. For KAF built upon independent round functions, see Fig. 2 (left), we prove security up to 2 2n/3 adversarial queries as long as the six round-keys (k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , k 4 , k 5 , k 6 ) are uniform and adjacent round-keys are independent. It seems such a sequence of roundkeys can be easily derived from a 2n-bit main-key K K via the "word-aligned", feedback-shift-register-based key-schedules that are widely adopted. As far as we know, this is the first beyond-birthday result on KAF without INDRK assumption.
More generally, when k 1 , k 3 , and k 5 are uniform in 2 n values, while k 2 , k 4 , and k 6 are uniform in only 2 n−r values, security is up to 2 (2n−r)/3 queries. While such round-keys appear quite artificial, it's valuable for two reasons: first, it appears the first step towards modeling key-schedules of the form {0, 1}
cn → {0, 1} tn for non-integers c; second, it cinches interesting implications on "partial-key" Even-Mansour and keyed sponges, which will be discussed latter. Application: A Concret Proposal for KAF Key-Schedules. Although our results turn heuristic once instantiated [13] , we believe they shed some light on how to design key-schedules for practical Feistel ciphers, which appear quite non-trivial. In particular, key-schedules of KAF ciphers need not to be overly strong nor "one-way", and actually key-schedules with some simple combinatorial properties could be a good starting point (a similar conclusion has been made for the IEM ciphers [14] ).
To further illustrate, based on our results and some additional intuitions, we propose to consider keyschedules that produce pair-wise independent round-keys 6 in KAF ciphers. We further demonstrate examples of such key-schedules. However, we stress that these proposals only serve as starting points for further research, and should not be used without deeper investigations. Multi-User (MU) Setting. The discussed super pseudorandomness model is now termed as single-user (SU) setting. It has been noticed that in practice, cryptosystems are typically deployed en masse and attackers are often satisfied with compromising some users among many, which can be substantially easier [8] . In fact, massively parallel attacks on many keys at once have been considered as the most promising way to break AES-128 [6] . These motivated the multi-user (MU) security notion [5] and a lot of follow up works-please see [12] and the references therein. For BCs, this could even affect higher-level systems: frequently rekeying is sometimes used in BC-based modes in order to achieve better security bounds [26] or leakage resilience [53] , and the security of such modes inherently relies on the MU security of the underlying BCs.
According to Mouha and Luykx [41] , the MU security of BCs was formalized as m > 1 instances of BCs with m independent user-keys being indistinguishable from m independent random permutations. This could be related to the SU security: with m independent keys, a generic reduction shows the MU security is log m bits less than the SU security (Jager et al. showed that this is unavoidable for generic reductions [34] ). This is quantitatively weaker. Yet, interestingly, dedicated analyzes could usually establish MU bounds that are quantitatively the same as SU bounds [41, 55, 31] . Contribution II: MU Security of KAF. As mentioned, the MU security may be quantitatively weaker than the MU security. Yet, our positive results are proved via establishing the so-called point-wise proximity of Hoang and Tessaro [31] , and our bounds satisfy their "super-additiveness" requirement. Therefore, by their general transition, these establish MU security against 2 n/2 queries at 4 rounds and against 2 (2n−r)/3 queries at 6 rounds. To our knowledge, these constitute the first non-trivial MU provable results on Feistel ciphers.
We remark that it's not as trivial as it appears to ensure "super-additiveness" during the analysis. For example, this requires to get rid of terms of the form f (q f ) or f (q f ) · √ q e . In particular, our proof follows a "two-step" approach used by Cogliati et al. for analyzing tweakable Even-Mansour [16, 17] , yet neither of the bounds given in these works fulfills this requirement. To resolve this, we eschew many concrete approaches used in [16, 17] (in particular, the use of Markov inequality), and extensively use the expectation method from [31] instead, to derive more "smooth" bounds. As a final remark, Hoang and Tessaro proved that the SU and MU security bounds of IEM with INDRK are quantitatively the same [31] . While our results appear to indicate the same conclusion, we don't expect this to be true for KAF in general. A deeper investigation is left for future. Implications. As multi-user secure BCs, our provable KAF constructions could be plugged into many BC-based (secret-key) modes to reduce the size of (ideal) primitives in use, or to drop the requirement on the invertibility of the underlying ideal primitives. The latter is particularly attractive in the multi-party computation setting, in which invertibility could be quite expensive [50] . In addition, depending on the concrete parameters, in some cases, e.g. truncated CBC [23] , this even does not result in a security loss.
Less obviously, our general results on 6-round KAF imply that it's secure to alternatively use an n-bit key K and another (n − r)-bit key K at each round. With such an alternating key-schedule, the 6-round KAF collapses to a 1-round IEM with key 0 r K K and the permutation instantiated by a 6-round keyless Feistel permutation LR 6 , as in Fig. 2 (right) . Therefore, this shows instantiating the permutation π in the 1-round "Partial-Key" Even-Mansour
by a 6-round keyless Feistel permutation LR 6 preserves security, and for r > n/2 the security is beyond-birthday with respect to the domain-size of the underlying ideal primitives. This extends the birthday-type result of GR [24] (two more Feistel rounds for beyond-birthday security). This results in even more interesting implications. Sponge functions are versatile cryptographic primitives [7] . Keyed sponges can be used for encryption and message authentication. Many variants of lightweight keyed sponges can be rewritten as a construction built upon the aforementioned PKEM π 0 r K K cipher, and the sponge is secure as long as PKEM π 0 r K K is secure (maybe in the MU setting) [42, 1, 23] . Thus by the above implication, such keyed sponges could rely on PKEM
With the keys canceled, we obtain a sponge built upon LR 6 . Therefore, our results indicate: the random permutation underlying many keyed sponge variants could be securely instantiated with a 6-round keyless Feistel permutation LR 6 . For concrete security results please see Section 7.
We stress that these results cannot be derived from existing provable results on IEM/keyed sponges and keyless Feistel via general transitions. obtain CCA security. And (informally) their coupling argument could only reduce certain collision probability every 3 rounds. Consequently, they only obtained 2n/3 NCPA security at 6 rounds and 2n/3 CCA security at 12 rounds. In comparison, we follow a "two-step" approach [16, 17] for analyzing the transcripts of queries and answers of the distinguisher, transform the transcripts into input-output pairs of the inner four rounds, and then employ a more fine-grained and dedicated analysis. This allows us to remove much redundancy from the structures and successfully halve the rounds. Due to the randomness of the 1st and 6th round functions, every resulted input-output pair of the inner four rounds would only be involved in a single collision (one could see Fig. 4 for illustration), and this significantly simplifies the analysis. Still, the analysis for 4 rounds remains complicated, and the complexity is further increased by the aim of "super-additiveness" (as mentioned). We remark that such an analysis for 4-round KAF seems missing in the literature-Patarin's mirror theory-based analysis for 4-round LR [43, chapter 17] does not seem to be transposable to KAF.
On the other hand, our 6-round construction(s) could probably be further simplified while retaining 2n/3-bit security. However, we figured out some difficulties, see appendix A. Since verifiability of the proof is equally important, we favored the current construction and its relatively simpler proof. Despite this, our 6-round construction with 2n-bit main-keys has significantly improved upon existing results. In Table 1 , we make comparison with the results of LS [35] and GR [24] . We remark that GR's main motivation was to deepen the understanding of the Even-Mansour cipher [22] , rather than to study KAF ciphers.
Also, we list the relevant results on the popular LR and IEM models in Table 2 for comparison. We remark that LR results are in the standard model, and are better than the ideal model results on IEM and KAF in some theoretical sense. Yet, as emphasized before, KAF is closer to reality.
The results in Table 2 in particular include the aforementioned work of Gilboa et al., which proved n/2 security for a 2-round IEM variant with identical round-permutations and identical round-keys [25] . Moreover, the round-permutation is instantiated with a 2-round LR construction built upon a public random permutation. This construction is somewhat related to KAF: but it can only be transformed into a KAF variant with whitening keys rather than the "bare" KAF model studied in this paper (thus we denote KAFSP * ). Consequently, our result on 4-round KAFSF-as well as the usefulness of orthomorphisms in this setting-could not be derived from [25] . In addition, Ramzan and Reyzin proved birthday-type security for a variant of 4-round LR, in which the middle two round functions are public rather than secret [49] . As mentioned before, an interesting fact is that our 4-round minimal construction also captures the idea of leaving the middle two round functions "unprotected" (as the middle two round-keys are absent). In this sense, our minimal construction also deepen the understanding of the secrecy of round functions in Feistel ciphers.
Last, a series of papers analyzed idealized BCs in the indifferentiability framework, which is a different security model. Please see [19] and the references therein. Among them is a positive result [27] on a variant of KAF abstracted from NSA's cipher SIMON [4] . These works shed lights on designing key-schedules from a different point of view, and are thus complementary to ours. Organization. Section 2 supplies notations and definitions. Section 3 describes the generic distinguishing attack against any number of rounds. Then, Sections 4 and 5 respectively present our results on 4-round KAFSF and 6-round KAF and their security proofs. After these, based on our results, Section 6 presents our key-schedule proposal, while Section 7 makes discussion on the implications.
Preliminaries
Notation and General Definitions. In all the following, we fix an integer n ≥ 1 and denote N = 2 n . Further denote F(n) the set of all functions of domain {0, 1}
n and range {0, 1} n , and P(2n) the set of all permutations on {0, 1}
2n . For a random variable (s) that relies on another random variable s, we denote by E s∈S [ (s)] the expectation of (s) taken over all s ∈ S, and E s [ (s)] for short when the set S is clear from the context. For X, Y ∈ {0, 1} n , X Y or simply XY denotes their concatenation. Assume that the i-th round function of KAF is F i : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , and the corresponding n-bit round-key is k i , then the i-th round transformation of KAF is the permutation on {0, 1} 2n defined as
where W i−1 and W i are the left and right n-bit halves of the inputs of the i-th round respectively. And the t-round KAF is specified by t public round functions F = (F 1 , . . . , F t ) and a round-key vector k = (k 1 , . . . , k t ):
These functions may be completely independent, or correlated, or even identical. To highlight, we denote by KAFSF the variant with identical round function, i.e.
Note that the key spaces of these schemes are not fixed, and depend on the concrete contexts. As noted in [18], a KAF cipher with an even number of rounds can be seen as a special case of an IEM cipher. In detail, two rounds of a KAF cipher can be rewritten as:
is a two-round keyless Feistel permutation. As a consequence, in general, KAF ciphers should avoid using identical round-key, as otherwise the round-keys would cancel each other and the cipher would collapse to a single round IEM cipher using a keyless Feistel as the permutation and k k as the pre-and post-whitening key.
7
For convenience-in particular, to simplify subscripts,-we follow a classical notation system (which has been used for Luby-Rackoff schemes [48]):
-for 4-round KAF(SF), we take L, R, X, Y, S, T as W 0 , W 1 , W 2 , W 3 , W 4 , W 5 correspondingly, as depicted in Fig. 1 (left) ; -for 6-round KAF(SF), we take L, R, X, Y, Z, A, S, T as W 0 , W 1 , . . . , W 6 , W 7 correspondingly, as in Fig. 2 (left).
Multi-User (MU) Security of Blockciphers. We concentrate on the MU security with m users. The SU security definition corresponds to the special case of m = 1. Concretely, consider a t-round KAF built from t n-to-n-bit function oracles F = (F 1 , . . . , F t ). Only the round-key vectors k with certain context-dependent properties (will be identified) can ensure security. We denote by K the set of all k with such desired properties.
To study the indistinguishability, we consider a distinguisher D interacting with F. In the MU setting, D has access to additional m 2n-bit permutation oracles, which are either m instances KAF
with m independent keys uniformly picked from K, or m independent random permutations P (1) , . . . , P (m) . The goal of D is to tell apart the two worlds (KAF
, F) (termed the real world) and (P (1) , . . . , P (m) , F) (the ideal world) by adaptively making forward and backward queries to each of the permutations and the functions. Formally, D's distinguishing advantage is defined as
Furthermore, we consider computationally unbounded distinguishers, and we assume without loss of generality that the distinguisher is deterministic and never makes redundant queries. For non-negative integers q f and q e , we define the insecurity of the idealized KAF cipher as:
where the maximum is taken over all distinguishers D making exactly q f queries to each function oracle and in total q e queries to the permutation oracles (termed as (q f , q e )-distinguishers).
If a collision occurs among the m user keys, e.g.
are the same, while in the ideal world the corresponding oracles P (i) and P (j) are independent. For (q f , q e )-distinguishers, the number of involved users m cannot exceed q e . Thus such a collision happens with probability at most 2|K| . For simplicity, throughout the remaining, we only consider the MU setting in which all the involved user keys are distinct; and the bounds in the "normal" MU setting can be derived as our bounds plus the term H-Coefficients. We utilize the H-coefficient technique [46, 15] , and follow the paradigm of Hoang and Tessaro (HT) [31] . For this, we summarize the interaction of D with its oracles in the queries transcripts. Suppose D making q i queries to the i-th permutation oracle (P (i) or KAF F k (i) ), which are recorded as a set
2n indicate the queries and answers. On the other hand, for i = 1, . . . , t, the queries made to F i are recorded as
in which for each j ∈ [1, . . . , q f ], it indicates F i was queried on x i,j and answered with y i,j . Let Q E = (Q E1 , . . . , Q Em ) and Q F = (Q F1 , . . . , Q Ft ). Then the pair τ = (Q E , Q F ) will be called the transcript of the distinguisher in the MU setting: it contains all the information obtained by D during the interaction. In the SU setting, we have to focus on only one permutation oracle; therefore, we drop the index i and simply write
} for the permutation query transcript and write τ = (Q E , Q F ). Note that queries are recorded in a directionless (for permutation queries) and unordered fashion, but since D is assumed deterministic, there is a one-to-one mapping between this representation and the raw transcript of the interaction of D with its oracles (a formal proof could be found in [15] ). Also, the output of D is a deterministic function of τ .
Given a set Q Fi of function queries and a function F i , we say that
Similarly, given a transcript of permutation queries Q Ei and a permutation P (i) , we say
The latter definition also extends to the t-round KAF cipher built upon F and a key k (i) ; in that case, we write KAF
For all possible transcript τ that describes a possible interaction with either a tuple of oracles (P (1) , . . . ,
, we denote Pr re (τ ), resp. Pr id (τ ), the probability that D's interaction with the real world, resp. the ideal world, produces τ . Formally,
With these definitions, the core lemma of the H-coefficients technique states that the distinguishing advantage could be inferred from the ratio of Pr re (τ ) and Pr id (τ ) (which is a function of q f and q e ).
Lemma 1 (From [31]).
Assume that in the atk setting (atk ∈ {SU, MU}), there is a function ε(q f , q e ) > 0 such that for every possible transcript τ with q e and q f queries of the two types it holds
then it holds Adv
Following [31], the lower bound (2) is named "ε-point-wise proximity" of τ . We partition the key set K into two disjoint subsets K good and K bad such that K = K good ∪ K bad . Let Pr re (τ, k) be the probability that D interacts with the real world, where k ∈ K is sampled as the key, and receives a transcript τ . Moreover, we assume there is a fake key variable k in the ideal world that is uniformly selected from the key space K, i.e., k
With these, HT provided a general lemma for establishing point-wise proximity.
Lemma 2 (Lemma 1 of [31]). Fix a transcript τ with Pr
HT also proved that once such point-wise proximity results have been established for the SU setting, similar results could be established for the MU setting via a general transformation. For this we restate Lemma 3 of [31] in our KAF setting.
Lemma 3. Let t be the number of calls to F that a single call to KAF/KAF −1 makes. Let ε : N × N → R ≥0 be a function such that -ε(q f , q e ) + ε(q f , q e ) ≤ ε(q f , q e + q e ) for every q f , q e , q e ∈ N, and -ε(·, q) and ε(q, ·) are non-decreasing functions on N for every q ∈ N.
Assume that in the SU setting, for every transcript τ with q f and q e queries of the two types, one has
then in the MU setting, for every transcript τ with q f and q e queries, one has
Security Upper Bound: A Distinguishing Attack
Combining the idea of enumerating all the possible round-keys from [11] and the (round) function reduction technique of [32], the t-round KAF can be distinguished by O(N t−2 t−1 ) queries:
. . , L λ pair-wise distinct, and R 1 = . . . = R λ = R, and makes λ encryption queries
(2) For from 2 to t − 1, asks λ arbitrary distinct queries
n possible values of CON , if there exists t − 1 query-answer pairs (L i R, S i T i ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ), . . ., (x t−1 , y t−1 ) such that an almost completed computation chain is formed:
, and -k 3 = R ⊕ y 2 ⊕ x 3 , and -. . .
, and -. . .
, and further S = (k t−2 ⊕ x t−2 ) ⊕ y t−1 , then outputs 1 to indicates it's the real world (otherwise 0). N t−2 = 1, the probability of forming a chain is approximately 1. By this, a 6-round KAF ensure at most 4n/5-bit security. This should be contrasted with the results on the classical LR model (as discussed in the Introduction).
We also note that the t-round IEM ciphers built upon n-bit random permutations and independent roundkeys tightly ensure tn t+1 -bit security [31], which is better than the upper bound (t−2)n t−1 -bit here. This matches the folklore that compared to IEM ciphers, Feistel ciphers have more structural properties that are helpful for attacks (as a consequence, to ensure the same amount of security, KAF needs more rounds). Tight security bounds for t-round KAF remains an open problem.
Four Rounds for Birthday-Type Security
We first present a general positive result for 4-round KAFSF in subsection 4.1. Then in subsection 4.2, we discuss how to schedule the desired round-keys from a short main-key, and present our "minimal" provably secure construction.
A General Positive Result
The first step is to specify conditions on the round-key vector that will allow us to upper bound the probability to obtain a round-bad key vector in the ideal world (the definition of bad key vectors will appear later).
Definition 1 (Suitable Round-Key Vector for 4 Rounds). A round-key vector
is suitable if it satisfies the following conditions:
n (but they need not to be independent);
If condition (i) is seriously compromised, the cipher would essentially lost 1 or 2 rounds. E.g., when k 1 is only uniform in n possibilities, an adversary could derive the second-round intermediate value
with n guesses. The less obvious condition (ii) is intended to prevent palindrome-like relations in the derived round-keys, which have been found harmful [44] . To further help understanding, in appendix B we present attacks against some round-keys that do not fulfill condition (ii).
Instantiated with such a suitable round-key vector, KAFSF ensures birthday security. Proof. We devote to prove that in the SU setting, for any transcript τ , it holds
This along with Lemmas 1 and 3 would yield the two main claims. Due to page limits, the proof of Eq. (4) is deferred to appendix C.
How to Schedule the Key: The Minimal Construction
By Definition 1, it can be seen that if pair-wise independence is ensured between round-keys, then the key vector is suitable. We refer to Section 6 for how to derive such round-keys. Here it would be tempting to ask how to schedule a single n-bit key K into a suitable key vector. Below we identify a condition on a key-schedule γ = (γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 , γ 4 ) (setting k i = γ i (K) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4) that suffices for this purpose. We call such key-schedules good:
Definition 2 (Good Key-Schedule for 4-Round KAFSF). We say that a key-schedule γ = (γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 , γ 4 ), where γ i : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , is good if γ 1 , γ 4 , and γ 1 ⊕ γ 4 are all bijective maps of F n 2 .
As mentioned in the Introduction, one could take for γ 1 the identity, and γ 4 = ϕ, where ϕ is an orthomorphism of F n 2 , as in Fig. 1 (right).
Six Rounds for Beyond-Birthday Security
Similarly to Section 4, we also specify conditions on the round-key vectors first.
Definition 3 (Suitable Round-Key Vector for 6 Rounds). A round-key vector
, and k 5 are uniformly distributed in {0, 1} n ; (ii) k 2 , k 4 , and k 6 are uniformly distributed in 2 n−r possibilities; (iii) for (i, j) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 3), (4, 5) , (5, 6) , (1, 6)}, k i and k j are independent.
Unlike Section 4, in the subsequent analysis we find the uniformness of every round-key crucial. This is why we require all of them to be uniform (this is also understandable, since beyond-birthday security requires various types of collisions can be bounded by small enough probability, and thus requiring a larger amount of randomness). The (mild) independence is also crucially used in the analysis. To further understand the necessity, please see Appendix A.
Instantiated with such a suitable round-key vector, KAF ensures beyond-birthday security.
Theorem 2. For the 6-round idealized cipher KAF with a suitable round-key vector as specified in Definition 3, it holds
, and
Note that when r < n/2, the security is beyond-birthday-and when r = 0, the bound is of "typical" beyondbirthday form O(
. We devote to prove the following point-wise proximity result for the SU setting: for any transcript τ , it holds
Gathering this and Lemmas 1 and 3 yields the claims.
, |Q E | = q e , and |Q Fi | = q f for i = 1, . . . , 6, we first define bad key-vectors, then lower bound the probability Pr re (τ, k). These two steps correspond to the following two subsections respectively.
Bad Round-Key Vectors and Probability
Similarly to subsection 4.1, for any x i ∈ {0, 1} n , if there exists a corresponding record (x i , y i ) in Q Fi , then we write x i ∈ DomF i (and x i / ∈ DomF i otherwise), and write ImgF i (x i ) for the corresponding y i . Now, the definition is as follows.
Definition 4 (Bad Round-Key Vector for 6 Rounds). With respect to τ = (Q E , Q F ), a suitable key vector k fulfilling one of the conditions is bad:
-(B-1) there exists (LR, ST ) ∈ Q E , (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ Q F1 , and (x 6 , y 6 ) ∈ Q F6 such that k 1 = R⊕x 1 and k 6 = S ⊕x 6 ; -(B-2) there exists (LR, ST ) ∈ Q E , (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ Q F1 , and (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ Q F2 such that
, and (x 6 , y 6 ) ∈ Q F6 such that k 6 = S ⊕ x 6 and k 5 = T ⊕ y 6 ⊕ x 5 .
Otherwise we say k is good. Denote by K bad the set of bad key vectors.
We now prove
Consider (B-1) first. Since we have at most q e q 2 f choices for (LR, ST ) ∈ Q E and (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ Q F1 and (x 6 , y 6 ) ∈ Q F6 and since k 1 , resp. k 6 , is uniform in 2 n , resp. 2 n−r possibilities, and further since k 1 and k 6 are independent (cf.
Similarly, since k 1 and k 2 are random and independent, and we have at most q e q 2 f choices for (LR, ST ) ∈ Q E and (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ Q F1 and (
The sum yields (6).
Analysis for Good Keys
Fix a good round-key vector k, we are to derive a lower bound for the probability Pr[
It consists of two steps. In the first step, we will lower bound the probability that a pair of functions (F 1 , F 6 ) satisfies certain "bad" conditions that will be defined. With the values given by a "good" pair of functions (F 1 , F 6 ), a transcript of the distinguisher on 6 rounds can be transformed into a special transcript on 4 rounds; in this sense, we "peel off" the outer two rounds. Then in the second step, assuming (F 1 , F 6 ) is good, we analyze the induced 4-round transcript to yield the final bounds. In the following, each step would take a subsubsection. As mentioned in the Introduction, this two-step approach is motivated by Cogliati et al. [17, 16] .
Peeling off the Outer Two Rounds. Pick a pair of functions (F 1 , F 6 ) such that F 1 Q F1 and F 6 Q F6 , and for each (LR,
In this way we obtain q e tuples of the form (RX, AS); for convenience we denote the set of such induced tuples by Q * E (F 1 , F 6 ). We further denote by EQ(X) the set that contains all such induced tuples with their second coordinate equaling X-formally,
And we define several key-dependent quantities characterizing τ :
Then we define a predicate Bad(F 1 , F 6 ) on the pair (F 1 , F 6 ), which holds if the corresponding induced set Q * E (F 1 , F 6 ) fulfills at least one of the following five "collision" conditions (see Fig. 3 for illustration): -(C-1) there exists three records (RX, AS) ∈ Q * E (F 1 , F 6 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ Q F2 , and (x 5 , y 5 ) ∈ Q F5 such that k 2 = X ⊕ x 2 and k 5 = A ⊕ x 5 ; -(C-2) there exists three records (RX, AS) ∈ Q * E (F 1 , F 6 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ Q F2 , and (x 3 , y 3 ) ∈ Q F3 such that
-(C-3) there exists three records (RX, AS) ∈ Q * E (F 1 , F 6 ), (x 4 , y 4 ) ∈ Q F4 , and (x 5 , y 5 ) ∈ Q F5 such that
, and a pair (x 2 , y 2 ) in Q F2 such that X = X and k 2 = X ⊕ x 2 ; or, symmetrically, two distinct (RX, AS), (R X , A S ) in Q * E (F 1 , F 6 ) and a pair (x 5 , y 5 ) in Q F5 such that A = A and k 5 = A ⊕ x 5 ; -(C-5) there exists two distinct (RX, AS), (R X , A S ) in Q * E (F 1 , F 6 ) and a pair (x 2 , y 2 ) in Q F2 such that A = A and k 2 = X ⊕ x 2 ; or, symmetrically, two distinct (RX, AS), (R X , A S ) in Q * E (F 1 , F 6 ) and a pair (x 5 , y 5 ) in Q F5 such that X = X and 
Proof. Due to page limits please see appendix D for the proofs for:
Summing over them gives the result. All the arguments rely on the uniformness of entries of F, which are uniform in 2 n values rather than 2 n−r . This clarifies why the bounds have nothing to do with the term 2 r .
Analyzing the Inner Four Rounds. Let
This captures the probability that the inner four rounds of KAF "extend" the tuples in Q * E (F 1 , F 6 ). The probability Pr re (τ, k) can be related to it.
Lemma 5. Assume that there exists a function
Then we have F 6 )] for convenience. Then, clearly, once F 1 and F 6 are fixed such that F 1 Q F1 and F 6 Q F6 , the event KAF
Therefore,
(by (7))
as claimed.
We now prove the assumption of Lemma 5.
Lemma 6. For any fixed good tuple (F 1 , F 6 ), there exists a function (F 1 , F 6 , k) of the function pair and the round-key vector k such that the inequality (7) mentioned in Lemma 5 holds. Moreover,
Proof. The general expression of (F 1 , F 6 , k) is a function of several variables defined before, which suffers from a bad readability. Therefore, we directly establish (and present) the bound on its expectation. However, due to space constraints, the full proof has to be deferred to appendix E. Below we present a sketch and the core results. According to the type of the involved collisions, we divide the tuples in Q * E (F 1 , F 6 ) into four groups (see Fig. 4 for an illustration):
We denote respectively E G1 , E G2 , E G3 , and E G4 the event that KAF
We next analyze the four groups in turn. The first one, i.e. Pr[E G1 | F Q F ], involves the most complicated analysis. Briefly, for each tuple (RX, AS) in G 1 , it consists of three cases: Fig. 4 . Partition of the tuples in Q * E (F1, F6). The value X, resp. A, in square satisfies k2 ⊕ X ∈ DomF2, resp. k5 ⊕ A ∈ DomF5.
(i)
collides with values that have been in the history. The probability that KAF F k extends (RX, AS) in this case is roughly at least
(ii) In the second case, the corresponding intermediate value Y collides with some "existing" values, yet the further derived Z is "free". The probability that KAF F k extends (RX, AS) in this case is roughly at least
(iii) The third case is symmetrical to the second one: Z collides with "existing" values, yet Y is "free". The probability is roughly at least
Summing over the above, we obtain
Yet, the above results are oversimplified due to the page limits. We in fact used many additional notations, cf. appendix E. The concrete bound is
To analyze E G2 , E G3 , and E G4 , we again apply the bad predicate approach. These groups involve collisions, and have relatively small sizes: |G 2 |, |G 3 |, |G 4 | = O(2 r · q 2 /N ) (will be proved later). Therefore, any collisions between tuples in these groups and values related to Q F or G 1 can be included in the bad predicates: for each tuple in these three groups the probability would be O(q/N ) with q = max{q e , q f }, yet it remains O(q/N )·O(2 r ·q 2 /N ) = O(2 r · q 3 /N 2 ) in total. See appendix E.5 for the formal analyzes. In all, the results are
Summing Up would yield a lower bound of the form
where 1 , 2 , 3 are in (9), (10), and (11) respectively. We note
for which
We now derive
To this end, note that by definition, β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 are quantities that depend on (F 1 , F 6 ):
Similarly by symmetry, using the randomness supplied by
N . Then we consider β 3 . We fix a record (LR, ST ) such that k 1 ⊕R / ∈ DomF 1 , and consider another (L R , S T ). If R = R then it has to be L = L and thus X = X . Otherwise, as
N . The number of distinct pairs of such tuples is at most q 2 e . Thus we know the expectation of the number of pairs ((RX, AS), (R X , A S )) such that X = X is at most 
As the number of (LR, ST ) such that k 1 ⊕ R ∈ DomF 1 is α 1 (k), we obtain
Symmetrically,
. Finally, since k 1 , resp. k 6 , are uniform in 2 n , resp. 2 n−r possibilities,
. Gathering all the above yields
as claimed in (8).
Concluding the Point-Wise Proximity Proof
Gathering Lemma 2, Lemma 5, and (6), we obtain
where (F 1 , F 6 , k) is the function specified in (7) . Note that its expectation has been bounded in Lemma 6 .
, since k 3 and k 4 are both uniformly distributed (in 2 n and 2 n−r values, respectively), we have
At the end of the previous subsection we have shown
r q e q f /N . Injecting them into the bound of Lemma 4 yields
Gathering all the above eventually establishes (5).
5.4 (2n − r)/3-bit Security from 2n − r bits Main-Key, and PKEM According to Definition 3, a suitable round-key vector could be derived from two independent main keys K and K , where |K| = n and |K | = n − r. A specific case is to alternatively apply the two keys. In this case, the construction collapses to a "partial-key" Even-Mansour variant
for LR 6 the 6-round keyless Feistel permutation built from 6 independent random functions; see Fig. 2 (right) . On the other hand, with an orthomorphisms ϕ one could set the key vector to (K, K , ϕ(K), ϕ(K ), K, K ), with which the KAF would be a "normal" Feistel cipher rather than "collapsing" to PKEM.
6 Application: A Proposal for KAF Key-Schedules
To further show the usefulness of our theoretical results, we propose some concrete key-schedules for KAF ciphers. In detail, we propose to consider key-schedules with produced round-keys (k 1 , . . . , k t ) satisfying the following three conditions:
(i) Uniformness: every k i is uniform in {0, 1} n ; (ii) Pair-Wise Independence (PWI): any two round-keys k i and k j are independent; (iii) Distinctness: it's hard to find weak keys K that gives rise to identical round-keys k 1 = . . . = k t .
The considerations behind PWI are two-fold. First, such round-keys satisfy both Definitions 1 and 3, and are thus supported by our theoretical results. Second, it's intuitively good: independence between round-keys plays a crucial role in our analysis, and would probably help simplify the proof for tighter bounds for 5 and 6 rounds.
The property distinctness is rather informal. It's intended to prevent the KAF cipher from collapsing to 1-round IEM. Note that PWI is able to prevent such collapsing with "significant probability"; however, this is not enough, since the number of (weak) main-keys that would cause such collapsing may not be small enough from the view of practitioners; see Appendix F for an example.
As discussed in the Introduction, common "word-aligned" key-schedules usually ensure independence between adjacent round-keys. This deviates from PWI, and the latter is not clear to be achieved by ad hoc designs. Fortunately, the three properties can be achieved from a 2n-bit main-key K = K
th values in the prime sequence 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, . . . respectively. Then, for t 2 n rounds (which is usually the case), one can set
The proof for PWI is quite simple, and is given in Appendix F.
PWI cannot be achieved from κ < 2n main-key bits. However, nowadays it's rather uncommon for a BC to have key-size smaller than its block-size. On the other hand, instances of Feistel ciphers with 2n-bit blocks and 2n-bit keys do exist: e.g. SIMON96/96 and SIMON128/128 [4] .
More generally, with a cn-bit main-key for c integer we conjecture c-wise independent round-keys are desirable. This is however not revealed by our results. We leave this as an interesting future direction.
Other Implications
As multi-user secure BCs, our provable KAF constructions could be plugged into many BC-based modes to reduce the size of (ideal) primitives in use. In some cases, this even does not result in a security loss.
For example, Gaži et al. proved that when the adversary makesueries of length < 2 n/4 , the PRF security bound of the truncated CBC mode built upon a 2n-bit random permutation is roughly
, where d is the length of the output [23] . By this, instantiated with our 6-round KAF (with r = 0), the resulted bound is ( q)
, where q f is the number of adversarial function queries. It can be seen that this is the same as the original when d ≥ 7n/6 (i.e. the output is sufficiently long) and q f 2 2n/3 . We refer to Appendix G.1 for details about truncated CBC.
Lightweight Keyed Sponges
A more interesting implication is on keyed sponges. Many lightweight keyed sponges with permutation π have their security rely on the (MU) security of the Even-Mansour variant PKEM (12)), these keyed sponges could be based on PKEM LR6 0 r K K instead. And after the keys are canceled, we obtain keyed sponge variants using LR 6 as the permutation. This means the permutation underlying many keyed sponges can be securely instantiated with LR 6 . This results in an improved implementation efficiency (maybe at the expense of a decreased security). And when r < n/2, security of resulted construction is beyond-birthday with respect to n, the size of the underlying ideal functions. This is usually fulfilled in lightweight sponges, since relatively large c = 2n − r is desired: e.g. all the members in the Photon family [29] .
Concretely, consider the "inner-keyed" sponge with a 2n-bit permutation π first. By [1] , for any distinguisher making q c queries to the sponge and q π queries to π, the corresponding distinguishing advantage (from a random oracle) is
, where σ is the total number of blocks in the q c construction queries. Therefore, by our results, the security bound of the inner-keyed sponge with LR 6 is
where q f is the number of adversarial random function queries. It's not hard to see similar implications can be derived on "outer-keyed" sponge; however, we are unable to derive concrete bounds. We refer to Appendix G.2 for more details. Another example is Chaskey [42], which is a sponge-like MAC of Mouha et al. With a 2n-bit permutation π, the designers proved that the MAC security bound of Chaskey π is (roughly)
, where d is the tag size, σ is total number of blocks in the adversarial MAC queries, and q π is the number of adversarial queries to π. Therefore, the security bound of the variant Chaskey LR6 is
, where q f is the number of adversarial random function queries. We refer to Appendix G.3 for the details of Chaskey. 
A Difficulties on Further Improving Attempts, and Comparison to IEM
For our 4-round result, the only space for improvements is to exhibit other conditions on the round-keys that are sufficient for security yet not implied by Definition 1. This seems to be only of theoretical interest.
For our 6-round result, further improvements could be in two directions. The first one is to prove beyond-birthday security for 6-round with less than 2n-bit main-key (hopefully an n-bit main-key, like [14] ). In other words, dropping the independence assumption in Definition 3. But there are some obstacles as follows (these also clarify why we need some independence between the round-keys.)
If only a single n-bit main-key is used, then the MU security is at most n/2-bit, since an attack utilizing keycollisions could be launched [8] . Therefore, the obstacles are only meaningful for the SU security proof. In detail, we figured out obstacles in the argument for bad keys. Assume that k1 and k2 are derived from the same n-bit main-key K via two efficiently computable n-bit permutations: k1 = γ1(K), k2 = γ2(K). Then, to bound the probability of (B-2) (in Definition 4), one would define BadK as the set of main-keys K such that there exists (LR, ST ) ∈ QE, (x1, y1) ∈ QF 1 , and (x2, y2) ∈ QF 2 such that
Then one tries to prove |BadK|
It seems very hard to handle if γ1 and γ2 are non-linear. 8 On the other hand, when they are linear, these imply
Since the y1 values are given by F1 and thus uniform, it would be tempting to bound |BadK| by the sum-capture lemma (as done by Chen et al. for 2-round Even-Mansour [14] ). However, to reach the desired bound of O(q 3/2 /N ), the sum-capture lemma requires that the number of choices for the above A and B are both O(q). While for B = γ −1 2 (x2) the number of choices is indeed q f = O(q), for A it is clearly possible to relate all the qe queries (LR, ST ) to the same value of γ −1
2 (L). This would make the proof approach fail. In fact, the above failure is not because the proof approach is not fine-grained enough, but because Pr[(B-2)] = O(q 3/2 /N )-there indeed exists an attack that could make (B-2) fulfilled in O( √ N ) queries:
2 ) → y
After the above four steps, we remark that it's possible to observe three records (LiRi, SiTi), (x 
2 ) such that
For this, we note that due to step (1), for all the q = √ N choices of LiRi, it holds
2 )), we have
2 )) such that there exists K such that The second direction is to consider 6-round KAFSF. With some additional (yet still mild) assumptions on the roundkeys, this seems plausible. However, the proof is expected to be much more involved than our Section 5 (which is already more complicated than existing analyzes on tweakable Even-Mansour [16,17]-largely because the structural features of KAF are more complex than tweakable Even-Mansour). As mentioned in Introduction, we'd like to have a better proof verifiability. Therefore, we only leave this direction for future.
B Attacking Some Unsuitable Round-Keys
The simplest example is the round-key vector k = (K, K, K, K). As already discussed in the Introduction, with this schedule we have the severe weakness KAFSF k (LR) = ST ⇔ KAFSF k (T S) = RL. Below we consider a less trivial example: we consider a xoring-constant-based key vector k = (K, 0, 0, K ⊕ c), where c is a public constant. With this schedule, there is an attack against the 4-round KAFSF, which proceeds in 3 steps as follows:
(1) Arbitrarily chooses L and R, and makes 2 encryption queries:
-KAFSF k (L R) → S T , and KAFSF k (L ⊕ c R) → S T ; (2) Makes 2 more encryption queries: 
Therefore, in the real world, it necessarily holds
Adding some restrictions on the derived k2 and k3 may cinch a security proof without the condition (ii). However, such a definition of suitable round-key vector cannot be deemed simpler than Definition 1. Therefore, the current Definition 1 has been minimal in some sense-although it's not necessary.
As a comparison, Nandi has characterized the round-key vectors secure for the LR cipher. His result was that nonpalindromeness (i.e. the order of key indices is not same with its reverse order) is necessary and sufficient for the security of LR [44] . This also reveals the difference between LR and KAFSF: while our first example (K, K, K, K) is palindrome, our second example (K, 0, 0, K ⊕ c) is clearly not palindrome. Still, (K, 0, 0, K ⊕ c) is not secure for KAFSF.
C Proof of Eq. (4)
To prove Eq. (4), we follow the paradigm mentioned in Lemma 2: we fix a transcript τ = (QE, QF ) with |QE| = qe and |QF | = q f , then distinguish good and bad key-vectors with respect to τ , and finally analyze the probability Prre(τ, k) for good k. For convenience, for any x ∈ {0, 1} n , if there exists a corresponding record (x, y) in QF , then we write x ∈ DomF (and x / ∈ DomF otherwise).
Bad Keys are now defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Bad Round-Key Vector for 4 Rounds). With respect to τ = (QE, QF ), a suitable round-key vector k is bad, if at least one of the following conditions is fulfilled (note that the analysis is in the SU setting):
-(B-1) there exists (LR, ST ) ∈ QE such that either k1 ⊕ R ∈ DomF or k4 ⊕ S ∈ DomF; -(B-2) there exists two (not necessarily distinct) (LR, ST ) and (L R , S T ) in QE such that k1 ⊕ R = k4 ⊕ S .
Otherwise we say k is good. Denote by K bad the set of bad round-key vectors.
For each of the qe records (LR, ST ), since both k1 and k4 are uniformly distributed in {0, 1} n and since |DomF | = |QF | = q f , the probability that it fulfills (B-1) does not exceed
. On the other hand, for each of the q 2 e pairs of records (LR, ST ) and (L R , S T ), since k1 ⊕ k4 is uniform, the probability that the pair fulfills (B-2) does not exceed
Lowering Bounding the Probability for Good Keys. We now lower bound the probability Prre(τ, k) for an arbitrary good round-key vector k. For this, we follow a clean "predicate" approach from [20]: we define a "bad" predicate Bad(F) on F, such that if Bad(F) does not hold (the probability of which has a lower bound), then the event KAFSF QE is equivalent to 2qe new and distinct equations on the random round function F. For convenience, we first define
n :(LR, ST ) ∈ QE for R = k1 ⊕ x and some L, S, T, or (LR, ST ) ∈ QE for S = k4 ⊕ x and some L, R, T.}.
Clearly, |ExtF | ≤ 2qe. Then, for any n-to-n-bit function F QF , the predicate Bad(F) holds, if one of the following conditions is fulfilled:
, we consider the conditions in turn. First, as k is good, for any (LR, ST ) ∈ QE we have k1 ⊕ R / ∈ DomF ∪ ExtF and k4 ⊕ S / ∈ DomF ∪ ExtF. Thus conditioned on F QF , the values F(k1 ⊕ R) and F(k4 ⊕ S) remain uniformly distributed, and thus
. Second, for any two tuples (LR, ST ) and (L R , S T ) from QE, the two function values F(k1 ⊕ R) and F(k4 ⊕ S ) are independent by ¬(B-2). Then as argued, we have 
is not possible. Otherwise, since F(k1 ⊕ R) is uniform (as argued before), the probability to have 
Using an arbitrary order, write QE = {(L1R1, S1T1), . . . , (Lq e Rq e , Sq e Tq e )}, and for a given F, let
= k2 ⊕ Lq e ⊕ F(k1 ⊕ Rq e ), and
It can be seen that for each (LiRi, SiTi) ∈ QE, we have
Additionally, conditioned on F QF and ¬Bad(F), (a) the induced values x
3 then (C-2) is fulfilled), and (b) the 2qe images F(x
) remain fully undetermined and thus uniform, otherwise (C-1) is fulfilled. Therefore, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , qe} we have Pr[F(x
Gathering this and (13) and Lemma 2 yields the claim of (4).
D Proof of Lemma 4
We upper bound the probabilities of the bad conditions in turn.
Condition (C-1). For any (RX, AS) ∈ Q *
E (F1, F6), if there exists (x2, y2) ∈ QF 2 and (x5, y5) ∈ QF 5 such that k2 = X ⊕ x2 and k5 = A ⊕ x5, then we would have L ⊕ F1(k1 ⊕ R) = k2 ⊕ x2 and T ⊕ F6(k6 ⊕ S) = k5 ⊕ x5 for the corresponding (LR, ST ) ∈ QE. It cannot be k1 ⊕ R ∈ DomF1, as otherwise k1 ⊕ R ∈ DomF1 along with k2 = X ⊕ x2 fulfill (B-2) in Definition 4; similarly, it cannot be k6 ⊕ S ∈ DomF6. Thus conditioned on F1 QF 1 and F6 QF 6 , the two values F1(k1 ⊕ R) and F6(k6 ⊕ S) remain uniform. Thus for each 3-tuple ((LR, ST ), (x2, y2), (x5, y5)), the probability that both L ⊕ F1(k1 ⊕ R) = k2 ⊕ x2 and T ⊕ F6(k6 ⊕ S) = k5 ⊕ x5 hold is at most 1 N 2 . Since we have at most qeq 2 f such 3-tuples, the total probability does not exceed
Conditions (C-2) and (C-3). Consider (C-2) first. By definitions, the number of triplets ((LRX, AST ), (x2, y2), (x3, y3)) such that k3 = R ⊕ y2 ⊕ x3 is α2,3(k), where (LRX, AST ) is a "merged" notation for (LR, ST ) and the corresponding induced X and A. On the other hand, k2 
Condition (C-4).
Consider the first half of (C-4) first, and consider such two tuples (LRX, AST ) and (L R X , A S T ). We note that neither k1 ⊕ R nor k1 ⊕ R can be in DomF1, as otherwise it fulfills (B-2). Thus conditioned on F1 QF 1 , both F1(k1 ⊕ R) and F1(k1 ⊕ R ) remain uniform. Thus
The number of choices of (LRX, AST ), (L R X , A S T ), and (x2, y2) is at most q 2 e q f , thus the probability of the first half is at most 
Condition (C-5).
Consider the first half of the condition, and consider such three tuples (LRX, AST ), (L R X , A S T ), and (x2, y2) ∈ QF 2 respectively. By ¬(B-2), k1 ⊕ R / ∈ DomF1. Depending on the state of S, we distinguish two cases:
-Case 1: k6⊕S / ∈ DomF6. Then we have at most qe choices for (LRX, AST ) and at most qe choices for (L R X , A S T ). Conditioned on F6 QF 6 , F6(k6 ⊕ S) remains random, thus
. Thus the probability is at most 
. Thus the probability that there exists at least one such tuple (LRX, AST ) is at most
Summing over the two cases results in
. The analysis for the second half is similar by symmetry, giving
E Proof of Lemma 6
Lower Bounding the Probability Pr[EG 1 | F QF ]. We write G1 = { (R1X1, A1S1) , . . . , (R |G 1 | X |G 1 | , A |G 1 | S |G 1 | )} using some arbitrary order. Let E be the event that KAF F k extends the -th tuple (R X , A S ). Then
th tuple (R +1 X +1 , A +1 S +1 ). The approach is to lower bound the probability that E +1 is equivalent to 2 new and distinct equations on F2, F3, F4, and F5. For this, we define four sets for positions "occupied by previous tuples":
We note that for any x3 ∈ ExtF ( ) 3 , conditioned on E ∧ . . . ∧ E1, the value F3(x3) has been "fixed" according to a corresponding tuple, and cannot be deemed random. Similarly for F4(x4) with x4 ∈ ExtF ) and
And then it holds
And then it holds F4(k4 ⊕ Z +1 ) = Y +1 ⊕ A +1 and F5(x ( +1) 5 ) = Z +1 ⊕ S +1 ; -Case 3, "right collision": Similarly to Case 2 by symmetry, the induced value
By these, we have 
E.1 Case 1
As (R +1 X +1 , A +1 S +1 ) is in G1, we have x ( +1) 2 = k2 ⊕ X +1 / ∈ DomF2. Furthermore, X +1 does not collide with any other tuples in Q *
) remains random, and
Similarly by symmetry,
Then, it can be seen the two equations F3(k3 ⊕ Y +1 ) = X +1 ⊕ Z +1 and F4(k4 ⊕ Z +1 ) = Y +1 ⊕ A +1 are fulfilled with probability 1 N 2 , and thus
One may notice that if we only consider this Case 1, then we would end up with an undesired birthday-type bound since |G4| = O(qe). However, this gap is filled in by the other two cases analyzed below.
E.2 Case 2
Recall that in this case,
, we upper bound the probability of the opposite case. It can be seen that Y +1 colliding with the involved (x3, x4) implies X +1 ⊕ y3 = (k4 ⊕ x4), where y3 = F3(x3). Therefore, we proceed to upper bound
where Coll(x3, x4) stands for the event
(where x ( +1) 2 = k2 ⊕ X +1 ). More detailedly, the to-be-bounded probability could be written as
= k2 ⊕ X +1 . In the following, we distinguish five subcases, and derive bound for each in turn. 
By this, and by the constraint that X +1 ⊕ y3 = k4 ⊕ x4, for each x4 ∈ G3F4, the number of x3 ∈ DomF3 ∪ ExtF ( ) 3 such that X +1 ⊕y3 = k4 ⊕x4 is Num ( ) 3 (X +1 ⊕k4 ⊕x4). Therefore, the number of such "bad" pairs is
On the other hand, similarly to Case 1, F2(x
, and thus
Subcase 2.2: x 3 ∈ DomF 3 , and x 4 ∈ DomF 4 . For this, we introduce a new k-dependent quantity:
Thus the number of such pairs (x3, x4) with
. Therefore,
Since k4 is uniform in 2 n−r values, it can be seen
. Therefore, the expectation of the probability is at most
Subcase 2.4: x 3 ∈ ExtF ( ) 3 \DomF 3 , and x 4 ∈ DomF 4 . By definition, we have
where x (i) 3 = k3 ⊕ Yi and Yi = Ri ⊕ F2(k2 ⊕ Xi) are derived from the i-th tuple (RiXi, AiSi) ∈ G4, and sgn (i) = 1 if and only if i is the smallest index satisfying these conditions and x (i) 3 / ∈ DomF3. We let y4 = ImgF4(x4) and write Zi = Si ⊕ F5(k5 ⊕ Ai). Now it holds y
Similarly to subcase 2.3, we distinguish two case:
(i) When Ei fits into Case 1, we have Zi = Si ⊕ F5(k5 ⊕ Ai) and F5(k5 ⊕ Ai) was uniform. Thus
This along with Pr[F2(k2
Note that for the fixed X +1 , Xi, and x4, the number of choice for x (i) 4 is at most 1. And for Y +1 to collide with x
Using a counting similar to subcase 2.3, we obtain
Subcase 2.5: x 3 ∈ ExtF ( ) 3 \DomF 3 , and x 4 ∈ ExtF ( ) 4 \DomF 4 . By definition, we have . In all,
Summing over the five subcases yields
The definition of Num ( ) 3 (y3) is recalled from (15) . Clearly, once such collisions do not happen, the mentioned requirements are met, and we have x4 / ∈ DomF4 ∪ ExtF cannot be "taken" by previous tuples. By these,
E.3 Case 3
In this case, since x ( +1) 2 / ∈ DomF2 and |EQ(X +1 )| = 1 and
Thus by lowering bounding the probability of colliding with such "bad" (x3, x4) we would derive the result for this case. Similarly to Case 2 by symmetry, we write
= k5 ⊕ A +1 . Similarly to subsection E.2, we also distinguish five subcases, and the arguments are similar by symmetry:
3.1: x 3 ∈ G 2 F 3 , and x 4 ∈ DomF 4 ∪ ExtF ( ) 4 . In this case, utilizing the constraint A +1 ⊕ y4 = k3 ⊕ x3, we have
where
3.2: x 3 ∈ DomF 3 , and x 4 ∈ DomF 4 . Define
Since k3 is uniform in 2 n values, we have
3.3: x 3 ∈ ExtF ( ) 3 \DomF 3 , and x 4 ∈ DomF 4 . By definition, we have 
By the above and a similar calculation, we have
3.4: x 3 ∈ DomF 3 , and x 4 ∈ ExtF ( ) 4 \DomF 4 . By definition, we have
It also holds Pr[Coll(x3,
On the other hand, when Ei fits into Case 2, it can be shown
3.5: can be shown
The above give rise to the following bound
where Num ( ) 4 (y4) is in (16).
E.4 Summary for E G1
Summing over the three cases results in
Note that: (a) |G2F3| ≤ |G2| = β1, |G3F4| ≤ |G3| = β2, and (b) |G1| ≤ qe. Therefore,
We finally consider qe−1 =0 B . To this end, we note that by definition, we have
and similarly,
So we eventually obtain (9).
E.5 Analyzes for G 2 , G 3 , and G 4
Consider EG 2 first: we lower bound the probability that it is equivalent to F4 and F5 satisfying 2|G2| new and distinct equations. To this end, again we define a predicate Bad1(F3), which holds if there exists (RX, AS) ∈ G2 that fulfills one of the following conditions:
(i) The x4 value derived using F3 is in DomF4, i.e. k4 ⊕ X ⊕ F3(x3) ∈ DomF4, where x3 = k3 ⊕ R ⊕ ImgF2(k2 ⊕ X);
(ii) The Z value derived using F3 collides with the Z value of another tuple in G2, i.e. there exists (R X , A S ) ∈ G2 such that X ⊕ F3(x3) = X ⊕ F3(x 3 ), where x 3 = k3 ⊕ R ⊕ ImgF2(k2 ⊕ X ); (iii) The Z value derived using F3 collides with the Z * value of a tuple in G1 or G3, i.e. there exists (R
We note that for each (RX, AS) ∈ G2, let x3 = k3 ⊕ R ⊕ ImgF2(k2 ⊕ X), then it holds x3 / ∈ DomF3 (otherwise fulfilling (C-2)) and x3 / ∈ ExtF
(according to the analysis of EG 1 ). Thus conditioned on EG 1 ∧ F3 QF 3 , the value F3(x3) remains uniform. Therefore, for this (RX, AS):
(i) the probability that Condition (i) is fulfilled is at most q f N ; (ii) for each (R X , A S ) ∈ G2, if the corresponding x 3 does not equal x3 then the probability of X ⊕F3(x3) = X ⊕F3(x 3 ) is at most 1 N ; otherwise, since the two tuples are distinct, it has to be X = X and thus X ⊕ F3(x3) = X ⊕ F3(x 3 ); (iii) for each (R * X * , A * S * ) ∈ G1 ∪ G3, the probability of
Summing over the above yields
It's not hard to see that conditioned on ¬Bad1(F3), the |G2| tuples in G2 indeed give rise to |G2| distinct values Z1, . . . , Z |G 2 | (otherwise Condition (ii) is fulfilled), for which F4(k4 ⊕ Z1), . . . , F4(k4 ⊕ Z |G 2 | ) all remain undetermined (otherwise Condition (i) or (iii) fulfilled). Furthermore, at the "right side", they also give rise to |G2| distinct values A1, . . . , A |G 2 | with F5(k5 ⊕ A1), . . . , F5(k5 ⊕ A |G 2 | ) all undetermined:
. . , F5(k5 ⊕ A |G 2 | ) remain undetermined, otherwise some Ai is shared between tuples in G1 and G2 and (C-5) is fulfilled.
Thus in this case, the event EG 2 is equivalent to F4 and F5 satisfying 2|G2| new equations, the probability of which does not exceed 1 N 2|G 2 | . We then consider EG 3 . The analysis is similar to EG 2 by symmetry: we define a predicate Bad1(F4) on F4, which holds if there exists (RX, AS) ∈ G3 such that one of the following conditions is fulfilled:
(i) The induced value x3 is in DomF3, i.e. k3 ⊕ A ⊕ F4(x4) ∈ DomF3, where x4 = k4 ⊕ S ⊕ ImgF5(k5 ⊕ A). The probability is at most 
The probability is at most
Similarly to Bad1(F3),
and conditioned on ¬Bad1(F4), tuples in G3 give rise to |G3| distinct values Y1, . . . , Y |G 3 | , while the assumption ¬Bad(F1, F6) ensures that they give rise to |G3| distinct values X1, . . . , X |G 3 | . Thus the event EG 3 is equivalent to F2 and F3 satisfying 2|G3| new equations. Therefore, conditioned on EG 1 ∧ F QF , we have
. By definition, for any tuple (RX, AS) ∈ G4, let x2 = k2 ⊕ X and x5 = k5 ⊕ A, then we have both x2 / ∈ DomF2 and x5 / ∈ DomF5. Moreover, conditioned on EG 1 ∧ EG 2 ∧ EG 3 , the two values F2(x2) and F5(x5) remain "undetermined" and uniform (otherwise, if EG 1 , EG 2 , or EG 3 implies F2(x2) being fixed, then a tuple in G1, G2, or G3 would share the same X value with a tuple in G4, contradicting the definition of G1, or fulfilling (C-4) or (C-5) respectively).
For these tuples, we would lower bound the probability that they induce 2|G4| new and distinct equations on F3 and F4. To this end, we define a predicate Bad3(F2, F5) on F2 and F5, which holds if there exists a tuple (RX, AS) ∈ G4 such that if we let x2 = k2 ⊕ X and x5 = k5 ⊕ A, then one of the following conditions is fulfilled:
-At the "left side", concerning F2(x2):
(i) The induced x3 value falls in DomF3, i.e. k3 ⊕ R ⊕ F2(x2) ∈ DomF3. As discussed, F2(x2) remains random, thus the probability is clearly at most q f N for each (RX, AS) ∈ G4; (ii) The induced Y value collides with some "previously-determined" Y , i.e. there exists another tuple (R X , A S ) ∈ G1 ∪ G2 ∪ G3 such that R ⊕ F2(x2) = R ⊕ F2(k2 ⊕ X ). It necessarily be X = X ; again using the randomness of F2(x2) we obtain the upper bound
for each (RX, AS) ∈ G4; -At the "right side", concerning F5(x5), similar to the above by symmetry:
(i) k4 ⊕ S ⊕ F5(x5) ∈ DomF4. For each (RX, AS) ∈ G4 the probability is at most q f N ; (ii) There exists another tuple (R X , A S ) ∈ G1 ∪ G2 ∪ G3 such that S ⊕ F5(x5) = S ⊕ F5(k5 ⊕ A ). The upper bound is
for each (RX, AS) in G4.
Thus using |G4| = β3, we obtain
Similarly to the analysis for EG 2 and EG 3 , conditioned on ¬Bad3 (F2, F5) , the event EG 4 is equivalent to F3 and F4 satisfying 2|G4| new and distinct equations. Therefore,
F More About Our Key-Schedule Proposal
Proof for PWI. We first show the proposal indeed produces PWI round-keys. Recall that the i-th round-key is defined by ki = ai ⊗ K1 + ai+1 ⊗ K2.
Following [36]
, consider any two round-keys ki and kj, and wlog assume j > i. We can write:
Clearly, ai ai+1 aj aj+1 ⇒ aiaj+1 − ajai+1 0 ajai+1 ai+1aj+1 .
Now assume that aiaj+1 = ajai+1.
By our definition, ai+1 > ai, aj+1 > aj, and gcd(ai, aj) = 1. So there exists an integer d such that ai+1 = dai, and aj+1 = daj.
Yet, ai+1 and aj+1 are primes, and aj > ai ≥ 1. So for aj+1 = daj it has to be d = 1. This implies aj+1 = aj, a contradiction. By these, the matrix given in (17) is non-singular, which means ki kj is uniform in {0, 1} 2n as long as K is uniform in {0, 1}
2n . The round-keys are thus pair-wise independent.
About Distinctness. We first remark that PWI round-keys could prevent the KAF cipher from collapsing to 1-round IEM. For example, in the 6-round KAF, if k1 and k3 are independent, then they would not cancel. Yet, a key-schedule that ensures uniformness and complete pair-wise independence may not be good enough. For example, consider the following one: While such round-keys appear good in theory, here comes a problem of weak keys: when K1 = 0, all the round-keys are equal-and equal to K2. As mentioned in Preliminary, in this case KAF collapses to a 1-round IEM with an n-bit main-key.
Such weak keys were ignored by the theory, since the probability of such weak keys is only 2 −n . However, this cannot be just ignored from the viewpoint of cryptanalysis-for example, when 2n = 128, this indicates a weak key set of size 2 64 . These motivated the requirement of "distinctness". And it can be seen that our proposal in Section 6 does not suffer from such obvious weakness any more (on the other hand, there may be some other less obvious weakness, which should be explored in future works). These also clarify why the description of "distinctness" was quite informal: because it stems from cryptanalytic point of view, rather than from formal arguments.
G Modes Involved in Section 7

G.1 Truncated CBC
The cipher block-chaining mode CBC calls a 2n-bit blockcipher E k (with a secret key k) to generate a key-dependent digest for a message M of arbitrary length. Its truncated variant only outputs d < 2n bits of the ciphertext of the last blockcipher-call. The motivation for truncation is to exclude length extension attacks [23] . For clearness we eschew a formal definition, and only provide Fig. 6 for illustration. For more details please see [23] . For the security, E k only needs to be a secure pseudorandom permutation. So any efficient pseudorandom permutation can be used here. ...
... The inner-keyed (top) and outer-keyed sponge (bottom) constructions. The padding schemes on the message are omitted. In both constructions, the output z is derived by concatenating a sufficient number of r bit blocks and then truncating to the right size. For the outer keyed sponge the key K is assumed to contain w blocks of r bits.
For sponges, the size of the internal state is usually denoted by b; and a b-bit cryptographic permutation π used to update the internal state. Since we are considering instantiating π with LR6, for us b = 2n.
Sponges usually divide the (padded) message M into r-bit blocks M [1], . . . , M [ ], with r < b stands for a parameter "rate". Then, they "absorb" these blocks in turn (as in Fig. 7) , in order to generate a internal state that depends on the entire message. This parameter r has the "same" meaning as the parameter r appeared in the PKEM cipher (1), and also as the parameter r appeared in Theorem 2.
So c = b−r bits of the internal state are not directly affected by the message blocks. This parameter is called capacity. The security of sponges heavily rely on c: the larger c is, the higher the security. On the other hand, lightweight sponges prefer keeping b small to reduce the implementation cost. So in lightweight sponges choosing r < b/4 = n/2 is something inevitable.
The "inner-keyed" sponges can be seen as sponge variants using 0 r K as the initial state, where K is the c-bit key. Please see Fig. 7 (top) for illustration. The subsequent processing can be viewed as successive applications of the PKEM π 0 r K cipher: consecutive calls to PKEM π 0 r K have their keys cancel out, leaving the "bare" permutations π in the construction. This relation was not only used for modular security proof [1, 23] , but also utilized by Soni and Tessaro in establishing the transition from public-seed PRP to UCE secure functions [52] .
The "outer-keyed" sponges just take the key K as the first part of the sponge input. Essentially, they can be seen as sponge variants taking a subkey L ∈ {0, 1} b (b = r + c) as the initial state, where L is derived from K using the sponge function. Please see Fig. 7 (bottom) for illustration.
As mentioned in subsection 7.1, by our results, instantiating the permutation by the 6-round keyless Feistel LR6 built upon 6 random functions retains security, and the security is beyond-birthday with respect to the size of the random functions when r < n/2.
In fact, for inner-keyed sponge, the bounds of Andreeva et al. are of a more sophisticated form [1] , and allow them to utilize some more specific features (termed multiplicity) of the cascade of PKEM π 0 r K to derive bounds better than ours (that given in subsection 7.1). Here we focus on giving a simpler discussion, and whether similar features could be utilized for PKEM LR 6 0 r K -based sponges is left for future. On the other hand, for "outer-keyed" sponges, since the key L for the PKEM is not uniformly picked but given by the key derivation function mentioned before, we could not directly plug our bounds into Andreeva et al.'s result. This application thus eludes a concrete bound. Yet, it's not hard to see that the permutation π in the outer-keyed sponges can also be securely instantiated by LR6.
For more details about the constructions and Andreeva et al.'s results, please see [1] .
G.3 Chaskey
See Fig. 8 for illustration. For more details please see [42] .
...
... * . Two different subkeys K1 and K2 are used to achieve a separation.
